Leonard C. Sebastian and Irman G. LantiThe study of international relations remains a reflection of a discipline that was self-consciously centred on North America and, to a lesser degree, the UK and Western Europe. The issue of whether international relations remains ‘an American social science’ or an international discipline and the implications of one’s answer to that question is becoming more critical as we seek to understand how to not only exit our current discontents but to better comprehend why we have done what we have done, and why we are where we are. International changes, whether labelled ‘the end of the Cold War’, ‘New World Order’ or the ‘War on Terror’, like other less significant events in the past have introduced a large measure of either disarray(if one was previously content) or effervescence (if one was not).Yet, what cannot be denied is the fact that there now exists greater possibility for theoretical innovation in the field in method, theory or perspective – and the likelihood that these innovations or insights may help not only to shape the field of study, but may have a practical impact on how people act and think. The field of international relations is after all a comparatively young one, which crystallized as part of the social sciences only during the 1920s and 1930s. Yet, how we interpret the history of the field and Asia’s place in it will influence the future shape of the discipline itself, and our understanding of our collective evolution is onedeterminant of our current direction. Comprehending the invention of our traditionsmay be both illuminating and influential. As prospects improve for internationalrelations that are fully international in the scope of its contributors, the broadeningof the disciplinary narrative will become more necessary than ever. In this regard,Indonesia may provide a useful exploratory study into non-Western approaches tointernational theory that could be both innovative and emancipatory.What is Indonesia’s self-image and what are the consequences of this selfimage?In the case of Indonesia we encounter an archipelagic nation-state thatconstitutes the islands that were part of the Dutch East Indies. While the Javanesecan be regarded as being politically dominant in the Indonesian state today, thenation was conceived as a multi-ethnic one, with each ethnic group having its owndistinctiveness and geographical domain within the national community. Unlikethe situation in Malaysia, for instance, most of these ethnic groups enjoy the similarstatus of being the native population of the nation. The Indonesian process ofnation-building, therefore, involves the integration of multiple ethnic groups andregions into a shared national identity. Such a national identity was the project oftwo authoritarian leaders, Sukarno and Suharto, who sought a centralized modelbased on cooptation and if necessary coercion to construct an ‘imagined community’based on Pancasilaist norms within unitary state structure.Since the collapse of the Suharto regime in 1998, Indonesia’s identity is influx, being shaped by the forces of reformasi (reformation), democratization anddecentralization. Indeed it is this very issue of shifting identity politics in thepost-Suharto era which having reawakened primordial sentiments in Indonesianow requires a domestic structure approach allowing greater scope to analysethe preferences or identities of the actors studied. Realism and neoliberal institutionalismhas rarely been used to good effect to examine the phenomenon ofnationalism or for that matter ethnic conflict within states. The approach adoptedin this chapter does not argue that the past can be a basis for the present, but thata distinctive Indonesian international relations tradition exists which can becomethe source of inspiration for alternative ideas about international order. In the openplural environment that now exists in Indonesia due to democratization, there aremultiple identities within Indonesia’s diverse polity that may shape internationalrelations thinking and it may be useful to investigate the content of these identitiesand speculate how their worldviews contribute to a distinctive Indonesian approachto international relations theory.Indonesia and the study of international relationsThe strategic perceptions of Indonesia stress integration and unity of regionsin its sprawling geopolitical domain. Indonesia does not appear to be primarilyconcerned with military threats from outside to this geopolitical domain. Theexception, as we will discuss later, is when the sphere of power of a Javanese/Indonesian ruler merges into the perimeter of his neighbour’s. Indonesia thoughwould be concerned with outside powers using ideological or economic means toencourage one of its outlying regions to turn against its political centre in Java.A concept of comprehensive security devised by the Indonesian military involvingall the regions of the nation called ketahanan nasional2 (national resilience) hadevolved to deal with such a perception of threat to the nation. Indonesia’s conceptof security is holistic and national resilience connotes all aspects of national life,i.e. ideology, politics, the economy, society, culture and the military. In particular,in the language of security, security and prosperity are interwoven and cannot beseparated from each other. According to a statement by Suharto in 1970:National resilience encompasses ideological resilience based on a nation’sown identity which receives the full support of the entire nation, economicresilience capable of meeting the nation’s own basic needs, social resiliencewhich ensures the feeling of solidarity and harmony among the peoples, andan appropriate military resilience to face aggression from outside. Withoutnational resilience we shall always be afraid.(Anwar in Alagappa 1998: 477)In mentioning the Javanese it is important to stress their centrality as an ethnicgroup within Indonesia. Their influence depends not only on numerical superioritybut to a certain extent on the potency of their culture. In significant ways,Indonesian ‘national security’ is understood in Javanese terms. The state itself,in accordance with the old Indian/Javanese mandala concept of polity, is definedby its centre, not its periphery. The concept of mandala according to Moertono isdescribed as:a complex of geopolitical relations, relating to boundaries and to contact withforeign countries. The doctrine emphasized the cult of expansion, a necessaryspur to the struggle for ex
istence, self-assertion and world domination, andthe dynamic factor calculated to disturb the equilibrium of inter-state relations.A state’s belligerence is in the first place directed towards its closestneighbour(s), thus making necessary the friendship of the state next to thefoe, which, because of its proximity, is also a natural enemy of the foe. Butif the mutual foe should be conquered, the two allies would become closeneighbours, which would create a new enmity. So this circle of alignmentand alienation would steadily expand until a universal peace is reached by theestablishment of a world-state with a sole and supreme ruler (charavartin).(Moertono 1968 cited in Anderson 1990: 44)National sovereignty is less threatened by trespass at the borders than by assaultson the ideological order promulgated from the centre. Social disturbances at thecentre are considered even more important than those occurring at a further remove.There are no political frontiers and such ‘flexible, fluctuating perimeters’ were areflection of the ‘Power of one ruler gradually fading into the distance and mergingimperceptibly with the ascending Power of a neighbouring sovereign’ (Anderson1990: 41). Such perspectives on frontiers highlight the significant contrasts ‘betweenthe old idea of a Southeast Asian kingdom and the modern state’ (Anderson1990: 42). Here we would need to assess Javanese conceptions of power. In theJavanese worldview, the total quantum of power in the universe must be constantimplying that any increase of power in a particular place means a correspondingdiminution elsewhere. Since power is unstable and readily dispersible, interstateaggression becomes necessary to maintain the status quo so that a Javanese ruler’sprestige is not diminished by the attraction of his neighbour’s power (Anderson1990: 44). Indonesia’s neighbours are quite willing adopt such interpretations toexplain Indonesian aggression in the 1960s and the invasion of East Timor in 1975.However, such perspectives also have explanatory power when analysing the willingnessof Jakarta to use force in peripheral regions such as Aceh and Papua.The product of such traditional Javanese thought is the division of the internationalrealm into two different types of states, namely Java and Seberang (a wordmeaning overseas but within the local Indonesian context referring to non-Javanesegroups) (Anderson 1990: 42).3 In the final analysis though, the use of force is theoption of last resort since a destruction of a rival power does not in any way result inany enlargement of a ruler’s power, rather it results in the dispersal of a rival power,which in turn could be absorbed by other rivals (Anderson 1990: 44). The use offorce is considered a kasar (crude method) of subduing a rival. While the Javaneseconcede that ‘wars are fought for truth’4 there is no glorification of warfare sincea decision to engage in warfare can be construed as an admission of weakness.Rather a more indirect method of absorbing a rival’s power was through diplomaticpressure or other halus (civilized methods) like the recognition of superiority orsome form of suzerainty (Anderson 1990 :44).The ‘centripetality of Javanese thinking’ together with perspectives of ‘graduatedsovereignty’ (Anderson 1990: 43) has two strategic outcomes. First, therewas a need to emphasize control of populations rather than territory (Anderson1990: 44).5 Second, it is important that the power and influence of the centreare manifested in increasing social prosperity. The security of this prosperity –often identified in terms of agricultural production and economic development– becomes an essential element of national security. Indonesia’s perceptions ofthe international community have been shaped by its past history and the internalmake-up of the diverse traditions of its communities. Among those different traditions,Javanese ideas of statecraft are historically the most developed and coherent.They are also perhaps the most influential of the traditional orientations.Both Sukarno and Suharto drew their inspiration from similar cultural traditions– a culture formed through syncretism between Hinduism and Islam (Yustinianus2005). In the mindset of Javanese leaders, there is little to differentiate betweenreality and the supernatural world. Like their predecessors, Abdurrahman Wahid(Barton 2002: 386), Megawati Soekarnoputri and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyonoare drawn to the practice of mysticism. All three have been seen visiting a varietyof sacred sites. President Yudhoyono is said to draw inspiration from Bima, apowerful but virtuous warrior in Javanese folklore. For a Javanese leader there isthe need to receive wangsit (divine guidance) in order to acquire political power.Such mysticism though is differentiated from klenik (black magic) and for Javaneseleaders a spiritual avenue to getting closer to God (Yustinianus 2005). Further evidenceof the marrying of cultural syncretism between Hindu and Javanese symbolscould be seen in the manner in which both Sukarno and Suharto used wayangsymbols drawn from the Indian epics the Ramayana and Mahabarata to expresstheir ideas. Sukarno often identified himself as Bima (Legge 2003: 33) and Suhartotook his inspiration from Semar. Yet despite such similarities both men chose toimbibe different identities drawn from Javanese history. Sukarno’s inspiration wasKediri’s King Kertanegara, and as the embodiment of national unity he identifiedwith Gadjah Mada who was determined to unite the archipelago under the controlof the Majapahit kingdom in East Java (Yustinianus 2005). Suharto, however,chose the methods commonly practiced by the resi (guru) during the Syailendra andMataram kingdoms called tapa brata kasunyatan choosing to increase his powerthrough communing with nature. Furthermore, Suharto was greatly influenced bythe military traditions of the Mangkunegaran royalty, particularly the perspectivethat those who wanted to be part of the inner circle of the kraton (palace) wererequired to serve in the Mangkunegaran legion (Yustinianus 2005). Naturally thereare practical reasons in the mid-1960s why Suharto rode on the coat-tails of themilitary to establish his power (Jenkins 19847). However, the desire to have militarymen as part of his inner circle and the establishment of the armed forces dualfunction or dwifungsi would also have been influenced by Mangunegaran militarydoctrine called the Serat Tripama first implemented by Raden Mas Said’s successor,Mangkunegaran IV. The narrow role of regime maintenance prescribed forthe Indonesian military by Suharto could be a direct consequence of his adherenceto Mangunegaran military tradition which emphasizes three principles: Sumantri(referring to a knight who defends his king and people), Kumbakarna (representingpatriotism) and Narpati Basukara (stressing the need for a knight to defend hisking’s throne as part of service to the king) (Yustinianus 2005). Even B. J. Habibie,the country’s third president though not of Javanese origin closely identified withorthodox Islam and was not averse to Suharto’s guidance on matters related tomysticism, which seemingly may account for why he choose not to adopt a foreignpolicy stance influenced by Islam.Indigenous sources for Indonesian IR theoryWhile there is still lack of effort among Indonesian IR scholars to develop anIndonesian IR theory, as we have discussed briefly, there are actually enoughindigenous sources from which the scholars can theorize if they choose to do so.The two major potential sources of research can be analytical work on the politicalbehaviour of leaders and detailed exploration of political thinking that are at leastpartially influenced by politico-cultural traits of the various ethnic groups inhabitingthe archipelago. Such approaches are an important starting point allowing us todevelop a sense of the cultural context whereby decisions are made without whichour insights into strategic behaviour may be narrow and insufficiently grounded.Indonesia is comprised of hundreds of ethnic groups and a coherent projectaimed at exploring these indigenous tradition
s can provide useful background forsignificant theorizing. In the absence of such theorizing enterprises and the absenceof an adequate body of literature among Indonesian scholars that draws fromindigenous sources, our exploratory work emanates from a basic understandingof political cultures representing the two major clusters of ethnic groups. We maybe guilty of oversimplification, but for starters let us evolve an experiment in pretheoryby analysing the politico-cultural traits of these ethnic clusters, namely, theJavanese and the outer islanders (Seberang tradition). There is pride in the greatnessof the ancient Javanese and Seberang kingdoms taught in classrooms acrossthe archipelago – admiration for Srivijaya and Majapahit, the Sultanates of Acehand Mataram to mention the most prominent. Those who live in Seberang areasare likely to look back to Srivijaya as a golden age and the Javanese revel in thehigh courtly civilization they have inherited from Majapahit and Mataram. Indeedthe Malay chronicles have highlighted the greatness of the fourteenth-centuryJavanese kingdom of Majapahit that enjoyed a brief period of ‘empire-building’under Gadjah Mada though it is important to note that the power of Majapahitwas conceived not only on the basis of military and political success but also onsuperior religious and cultural attainments. The ambiguity of power will alwaysmilitary to establish his power (Jenkins 19847). However, the desire to have militarymen as part of his inner circle and the establishment of the armed forces dualfunction or dwifungsi would also have been influenced by Mangunegaran militarydoctrine called the Serat Tripama first implemented by Raden Mas Said’s successor,Mangkunegaran IV. The narrow role of regime maintenance prescribed forthe Indonesian military by Suharto could be a direct consequence of his adherenceto Mangunegaran military tradition which emphasizes three principles: Sumantri(referring to a knight who defends his king and people), Kumbakarna (representingpatriotism) and Narpati Basukara (stressing the need for a knight to defend hisking’s throne as part of service to the king) (Yustinianus 2005). Even B. J. Habibie,the country’s third president though not of Javanese origin closely identified withorthodox Islam and was not averse to Suharto’s guidance on matters related tomysticism, which seemingly may account for why he choose not to adopt a foreignpolicy stance influenced by Islam.Indigenous sources for Indonesian IR theoryWhile there is still lack of effort among Indonesian IR scholars to develop anIndonesian IR theory, as we have discussed briefly, there are actually enoughindigenous sources from which the scholars can theorize if they choose to do so.The two major potential sources of research can be analytical work on the politicalbehaviour of leaders and detailed exploration of political thinking that are at leastpartially influenced by politico-cultural traits of the various ethnic groups inhabitingthe archipelago. Such approaches are an important starting point allowing us todevelop a sense of the cultural context whereby decisions are made without whichour insights into strategic behaviour may be narrow and insufficiently grounded.Indonesia is comprised of hundreds of ethnic groups and a coherent projectaimed at exploring these indigenous traditions can provide useful background forsignificant theorizing. In the absence of such theorizing enterprises and the absenceof an adequate body of literature among Indonesian scholars that draws fromindigenous sources, our exploratory work emanates from a basic understandingof political cultures representing the two major clusters of ethnic groups. We maybe guilty of oversimplification, but for starters let us evolve an experiment in pretheoryby analysing the politico-cultural traits of these ethnic clusters, namely, theJavanese and the outer islanders (Seberang tradition). There is pride in the greatnessof the ancient Javanese and Seberang kingdoms taught in classrooms acrossthe archipelago – admiration for Srivijaya and Majapahit, the Sultanates of Acehand Mataram to mention the most prominent. Those who live in Seberang areasare likely to look back to Srivijaya as a golden age and the Javanese revel in thehigh courtly civilization they have inherited from Majapahit and Mataram. Indeedthe Malay chronicles have highlighted the greatness of the fourteenth-centuryJavanese kingdom of Majapahit that enjoyed a brief period of ‘empire-building’under Gadjah Mada though it is important to note that the power of Majapahitwas conceived not only on the basis of military and political success but also onsuperior religious and cultural attainments. The ambiguity of power will alwaysbe a source of contention. However, are material measures the only legitimateapproach? What about the more cognitive aspects of power? (See, for example,Geertz 1983: 121–46; Milner 1982.)Javanese political cultureJavanese political culture has been more widely explored by social scientists thanthe Seberang political culture. This is probably due to the fact that the Javanese arethe largest Indonesian ethnic group and that theirs is one of the ancient civilizationsin the world (Geertz 1960: 78). Given their long history, the Javanese have built aculture that is complex, intricate, and rich in spiritual life. The cradle of Javanesecivilization is the fertile agricultural land in central Java around the present day citiesof Yogyakarta and Surakarta. Historically, it has been an agricultural society. Asin many such societies, the Javanese developed an inward-looking, insular, communitarian,status-conscious and hierarchy-minded culture (Liddle 1996: 65–6).Such cultural features are also due to the heavy influence of Hindu-Buddhism inJava, which had been the predominant beliefs of the Javanese prior to the arrivalof Islam in the fifteenth century. The caste system of Hinduism created significantsocial differentiation and stratification, which became deeply embedded within theJavanese psyche (Koentjaraningrat 1975: 58–60). Due to its emphasis on hierarchy,the concept of Javanese leadership makes a clear distinction between gusti (lords)9and kawula (subjects) (Lubis in Crouch and Hill 1992: 297; Uhlin 1997: 52).The idea of power in Javanese culture is rather peculiar. It runs against the commonperception of power in the West. Anderson argues that for the Javanese, poweris concrete and finite, and holders of power are expected to be able to demonstratepower through the possession of certain objects deemed to have supernaturalpowers10 (Anderson 1990: 27). Power is also homogeneous. It means that thereis no differentiation of types of power. It is also regarded as constant in terms oftotal quality. It means that an increase of one’s power must happen at the expenseof others. Thus, the quest for power is perceived as zero-sum. Lastly, power isdetached from moral questions. It is neither good nor bad,11 nor does it matterhow it is achieved. What does matter is whether one has power or not (Anderson1990: 22–3). In terms of accession to power, the Javanese believe that power iseither received from inheritance or from a divine favour (wahyu). Such favour isbelieved to be bestowed upon rulers of relatively humble origins, coming to powerafter a period of turmoil and bloodshed (Koentjaraningrat in Ibrahim et al. 1985:290; Anderson 1990: 38–9).In the Javanese conception, power is closely associated with ‘concentration’and ‘oneness’. Conversely, diffusion of authority means an impurity in power,and therefore should be avoided by all power holders. Thus, for a Javanese leader,diffusion of power within the state is regarded as a sign of weakness. A Javaneseleader will always strive to unite different segments of the society under his rule andtry to mould different – sometimes opposing – ideas believed by different groupsinto a single new idea that can be accepted by all (Anderson 1990: 22–3, 28–33).The search for harmony is the keyword in understanding Javanese social life,including statecraft (Anderson 1990: 28–33). The Javanese have a profound abilityto absor
b new ideas, select parts of new ideas suitable to their way of life, mergethem with the existing culture, and thus rejuvenate the old culture as well as creatinga new, syncretic one. Therefore the Javanese are known to be tolerant to theideas of others, so long as these ideas do not contradict the central assumptions oftheir social lives.Another important facet of the Javanese concept of power is the idea of pamrih12to explain the ruler’s downfall from power. A ruler is said to have pamrih in hisleadership if he refuses or hesitates to carry out his duty to the state because ofsympathy or empathy for his friends or family members. A pamrih is also said toexist if the ruler carries out a certain act in his personal favour (usually involvingmaterial benefits) or in the favour of his close associates or family members, orin other words corrupt and nepotistic practices (Anderson 1990: 51–3). Pamrihis a sign that the power of the ruler is weakening and that a change of poweris imminent.Seberang political cultureAs opposed to the vastness of scholarship on Javanese political culture, the politicalculture of the outer islands is rather inadequately covered. It is perhaps due tothe fact that, in contrast to the Javanese, there are various groups living in theseislands, and they tend to be spread out all over the archipelago. A relative lack ofcommunication among them, unlike in Java, has rendered the creation of a singlecivilization among these groups unimaginable. Hence, it is quite difficult to defineaccurately the presence of an outer islands (Seberang) political culture.Nevertheless, there are some common qualities shared by many of these non-Javanese ethnic groups, or at least among the larger, more assertive and articulativeones. Among these groups are the Acehnese, Batak and Minangkabau of Sumatra,and the Bugis and Makassar peoples of Sulawesi, as well as the people of theMaluku islands. The people living in coastal towns in the northern parts of Java(pesisir Javanese) can also be classified within this group, as well as the people ofBanten (the westernmost part of Java island).13According to Koentjaraningrat, there are two categories in the socio-geographicalfeature of these peoples. First, the majority of these ethnic groups live on the coastalareas. This is the case of the Minangkabau, Acehnese, Buginese, Makassarese, themany groups of Maluku and the pesisir Javanese. Second, others of the Seberangethnic groups live in remote interior areas. Prominent examples of this category arethe Bataks, Toraja and Minahasa of Sulawesi and Dayaks of Kalimantan.14These two categories of ethnic groups share a common feature concerning theextent of influence from Indic religions, Hinduism and Buddhism. Compared tothe vast Hindu-Buddhist influence in Java (and Hinduism in Bali), the presence ofthese two religions in the outer islands was much less prevalent (Koentjaraningrat1975: 57–60).15 As a result, social stratification did not become the main rule ofthe societies. While in many, if not all, of these groups there was a functionaldifferentiation, especially the existence of the rulers and the followers, in generalthe differentiation was not as complex and intricate as in the Javanese model. Inmany of these ethnic groups, especially in the coastal communities, the rulerswere less shrouded in an aura of mysticism and secrecy, and generally were moreaccessible. The decision-making process in the Seberang communities was alsogenerally more open and commoners were usually involved. The rulers frequentlyconsulted the public for decisions regarding the societies in consultation meetings(musyawarah) (Sjamsuddin in Najib 1996: 40–7; Effendi in Najib 1996: 83–7;Sairin in Najib 1996:142–6).The socio-geographical difference between the coastal and the interior non-Javanesesocieties did not amount to significant differences in their worldviews aboutstatecraft. While in the interior outer-island tribes there was a significant degreeof mysticism developed around the idea of power, the lack of Indic influencerendered a relatively more relaxed social stratification. The coastal communitieswere traditionally engaged in commerce and seafaring activities. As travellingmerchants, they tended to possess the qualities of being culturally open, directand individualistic. This was due to the relatively small amount of time that theyspent on land in their home villages, which did not enable them to contemplate ordevise elaborate social customs and traditions. As a result, one’s fortune was usuallydetermined by individual rather than collective effort. Additionally, the linguafranca of the seafaring merchants in the archipelago in the sixteenth or seventeenthcentury was Malay. As opposed to the complex Javanese language, the Malay languagewas comparatively egalitarian and less stratified.16 For these qualities, theJavanese have often regarded the Seberang people as ‘kasar’17 (Koentjaraningrat1975: 58; Anderson1990: 50–1).Compared to the Javanese, the cultures of the Seberang communities are lessstructured and elaborate. This is due to the small agricultural surpluses and highrate of mobility of the people (Liddle 1996: 66). In some instances, the effort todevelop classes of civil servants and nobility was interrupted by the strengtheningof colonial rule. Such was the case of the Bugis, where the direct rule of theDutch colonial administration made the use of symbols of nobility decline rapidly(Koentjaraningrat 1975: 94–5).Being maritime-based, Seberang cultures generally promote a greater sense ofindividuality than the agriculturally based Javanese culture. As opposed to Javaneseinclusive and assimilative traits, the Seberang cultures tend to be more exclusiveand rigid. The sense of ‘we-they’ is more prevalent in the Seberang cultures than inthe Javanese one. As an illustration, a Javanese would likely approach a differenceof opinion by attempting to reconcile the differences by finding a middle groundor a syncretic solution, whereas a typical Seberang person would likely approach asimilar situation by recognizing the differences while maintaining each individual’sposition or suggesting a competition between the different ideas.Islamic influenceThe differences between the Javanese and Seberang political cultures are moreapparent in the different reactions of the two cultures towards the influence ofIslam. Islam came to the archipelago in the thirteenth century, brought by merchantsfrom southern India and Persia.18 It first arrived in the archipelago in Aceh,the northern tip of Sumatra, where the first Islamic sultanate in Southeast Asiawas formed, known as the Samudera Pasai. It then spread to Malacca, where apowerful sultanate dominated the busy strait separating Sumatra and the MalayPeninsula. From Malacca, Islam spread to the coastal towns of Sumatra, whichwere under Malacca’s sphere of influence. Islam was next brought to the northerncoastal towns of Java, where a new sultanate of Demak was formed. During thefifteenth century, the rising Demak state challenged the power of the declininginterior Javanese kingdom, Majapahit. After a series of power struggles, whichinvolved a mix between peaceful and conformist proselytization of the local peopleand the use of force, Majapahit fell. In its place, a new Javanese sultanate ofMataram was established.The next stage was the Islamization of the peoples living in the other islands ofthe archipelago. This was primarily conducted by the Islamic Sumatra, Malaccaand Javanese sultanates. Before the arrival of European traders, Islam had becomethe predominant religion of the land. Its strongest foothold can be found all overSumatra except in the interior of northern Sumatra, the whole of Java, the coastalareas of Kalimantan, all over Sulawesi except in the interior of South Sulawesi andthe northern tip of the island, northern Maluku islands and western Lesser Sundaislands (Koentjaraningrat 1975: 20–219).However, there was a significant difference in the reception to Islam in Java fromthat in Seberang. Such a difference resulted in different forms of Islam being practicedin Indonesia. In Java, Islam won
adherents among the people primarily dueto the cultural approach taken by the Islamic proselytizers, known as the ‘wali’.20After the northern coastal towns of Java became Islamized through trading contactswith Sumatra and Malacca merchants, the effort to introduce Islam to the interiorJavanese was carried out primarily by the Javanese wali. In an effort to conveythe message of Islam to the Javanese masses, these wali employed the symbols,folklore, legends and rituals of the old Hindu culture, such as wayang and gamelan(Anderson 1972: 68). Such a strategy proved highly successful, and in a relativelyshort period of time, Java was Islamized.The message carried by the wali through the conformist strategy led mostJavanese to find Islam suitable to their way of life. This was aided by the fact thatIslam came to Indonesia from Persia and southern India, where it had already beenpatrimonialized21 (Anderson 1972: 68–9). Hence, in the interior of Java Islamicpractices were mixed with the existing Hindu cultural attributes. In many cases,Hindu practices were more dominant than the Islamic rituals. From time to time, theJavanese would engage in Hindu ceremonies glossed over by some Arabic wordssaid to be derived from the Qur’an. However, most Javanese would claim that theywere Muslims, even though they would rarely execute the Islamic rituals as definedby the ‘Five Pillars of Islam’.22 The people who practice this variant of Javanesenominal Islam are known as the abangan.23 In fact, the religious practices of theinterior Javanese, signifying a balanced syncretism between animistic, Hinduisticand Islamic elements, are so different from Islam, so as to create a new religionaltogether (Geertz 1960: 5; Liddle 1996: 65; Koentjaraningrat 1975: 21, 112–19,who called this belief as ‘Agama Jawi’ or ‘Kejawen’24).In East Java, which was considered a hinterland of Java, outside of the sphereof influence of ‘proper’ Java but still heavily influenced by the interior Javanesevalues, Islam was practiced more piously. Islam in this part of Java was developedthrough a complex schooling system known as the pesantren and its followersknown as the santri. Historically, during the height of Hindu Javanese kingdoms,religious and intellectual powers were not held by the ruling class residing inthe kraton (palaces) in the heartland of the Javanese culture (Yogyakarta andSurakarta). Rather these powers were possessed by the kyai (teachers) living in theeastern coastal and interior areas of Java. As opposed to the decadent lifestyles ofthe urban kraton ruling class, the kyai built, taught and led a frugal lifestyle in thepondok (boarding schools), located mostly in the villages (Anderson 1990: 126–9;Feillard 1999: 3–5).As in the other parts of Java, Islam was also welcomed and generally tookover the social institutions in eastern Java. And as in the kraton, the pondok alsoembraced Islam syncretically. For the most part, the teaching styles and rituals inthe pondok did not abandon the previous Hinduistic practices. Islamic teachingsbasically just glossed over the Hindu recitations. Additionally, the patrimonialworldview of the kyai towards power and leadership remained similar to thatheld by the Javanese kraton. But in contrast to the kraton, in most pesantren therelationship between the kyai and the santri was rather informal. Most kyai wererelaxed and casual when they related to their santri. Nonetheless, this interactionwas marked by the most stringent rule, namely that the kyai were to be respectedand the santri were to follow the creeds laid out by the kyai at all times. The santriwere also expected to protect and defend the honour and dignity of the kyai fromoutside criticism. It did not mean, however, that criticisms were not allowed to beuttered within the pesantren. In fact, in some pesantren the learning atmospherecould get very lively. But when it came to the interaction with the outside world,all santri were behind their kyai without any reservation. In essence, therefore,the presence of Islam did not alter the existing political culture and institutionalpower relations in Java.Islam took the purest form in the outer islands. Due to the lack of powerfulHindu kingdoms when it entered, Islam was embraced without any major resistance.Many local rulers in Sumatra and later on in Sulawesi and Maluku perceivedthat Islam was the religion of the merchants. Because of the flourishing trade withIslamic Malacca, the major trading power in the region at that time, the peoplesof the outer islands quickly embraced Islam in order to facilitate their businesses.They also did not have any major cultural objections to Islam. Islam seemed tofit the egalitarian lifestyle and simple social structure that these maritime tradingsocieties have developed over centuries. Furthermore, Islam was seen as an alternativeto the Hinduism then embraced by the Javanese.When Islamic reformism entered the archipelago in the early twentieth centuryby way of Malaya, the Seberang peoples were the first to welcome it. Islamicreformism was then a new movement propagated by the Egyptian MuhammadAbduh, aimed at purifying the teaching of Islam from local mystical practices.Reformist Muslims called for the return to the Qur’an and Hadits/Sunnah Rasul25as the sole guidance of Islamic teaching. The teaching also intended to rationalizeIslam and update it to the needs of the contemporary era, through the conceptof ‘ijtihad’.26 Hence, it was also called ‘Islamic modernism’. Again, the morestraightforward Seberang peoples accepted this movement wholeheartedly becauseit seemed to suit their cultural traits (Anderson 1972: 69–70; Koentjaraningrat1975: 45; Feillard 1999: 6–7; Feith and Castles: 201). Therefore, the type of Islamdeveloped in these communities was different from the Javanese variants.Political behaviour of Indonesian leaders as a source fortheoryAs the world’s largest Muslim nations, there is a natural inclination to considerIndonesia as a source for alternative thinking or behaviour that reflects Islamictradition. But this has not been the case. There are three reasons why Islamicthinking and praxis on international relations have not prominently come out ofIndonesia. First, as mentioned above, purist Islam grew mostly in Seberang areas,and while the Seberang have been actively involved in Indonesian politics, theyhave not been able to occupy national leadership positions, which have been byand large dominated by the Javanese. Hence, no distinctive Islamic praxis can beobserved from the Indonesian experience. Second, in the Islamic world, Indonesiaand Southeast Asians have been perceived largely as occupying marginal positions.The Middle East remains to be seen as the centre of Islamic excellence. Whilemany Indonesians went to educational institutions in the Middle East, such as theAl Azhar in Cairo or Medina Islamic University in Saudi Arabia, there is practicallyno internationally renowned Islamic educational institution in Indonesia. Thirdand perhaps most important, the preoccupation of Islamic groups in Indonesiahas traditionally been revolved around statehood and issues, that is, the statefoundation (the issue of Islamic versus secular state), open political competitionversus authoritarian control, and centralized rule versus regional autonomy. Thisfact indicates two things. First, Indonesian Muslim groups do not hold particularaffinity towards the idea of global Islamic ummah ruled under an Islamic khilafah.They see Indonesia as a de facto basis for allegiance. If discussions on a globalIslamic ummah occurred, they are usually carried out in a theological rather thanpolitical sense. Second, international relations does not occupy a major positionin the list of priorities of Islamic groups. As most Indonesians view it, it is ratherseen as a luxury.So instead of Islam, the Javanese political culture seems to have dominatedmodern Indonesian leadership. Undoubtedly, studies on the Javanese politicalculture are much more explored and refined than the Seberang one. This is due tothree reasons. First, the Javanese are the largest ethnic group in Indonesia
. Theycomprise around 45 per cent of the whole Indonesian population. Second, theJavanese had a long history of civilization, which is reinforced by the presence ofa number of powerful and influential kingdoms. This has enabled them to developtheir political culture. Third, the majority of modern Indonesian leaders hailedfrom this ethnic group. Since independence, all but one Indonesian president havehailed from Java. As such, the bureaucracy and decision-making process have beendominated by Javanese culture.Indonesian foreign policy, during the Sukarno period but especially during theSuharto era, is a reflection of this political culture. The so-called ‘ASEAN way’,which stressed the consensual basis of forging and maintaining relationship amongASEAN countries was supported, if not insisted upon, by Suharto. It can be perceivedas a manifestation of the Javanese conception of achieving and maintainingharmony as one of the primary goals of social life. The Javanese tended to avoidopen disagreement and would naturally be inclined to attempt solving differencesby having closed door discussions, away from the eyes of the general public.This does not mean, however, that the Javanese are willing to bend backwards inorder to maintain harmony. In fact, the belief that power is ‘indivisible’ and must be‘concentrated’ required the Javanese to attempt to subdue the interests of others tothose of their own. Although this does sound like typical realist argument, it carriesan important difference. The Javanese would do their utmost to avoid using forceas a means to coerce others into doing or becoming something they desire. Theyview the Western conception of ‘power through the barrel of a gun’ as ‘kasar’,and therefore unappealing. Instead, the Javanese would attempt to use the powerof ‘personal charisma’ to influence others. The power of ‘personal influence’ maysound to Western scholars as fluffy and unsubstantiated, but for Javanese leaders,it lies at the very heart of leadership. As mentioned above, the Javanese believe thatone becomes a leader due to wahyu (divine favour), in which charisma is an integralpart. A charisma-less leader is an oxymoron for Javanese (Leifer 198327).And in many ways during the New Order, Suharto was able to use this powerof influence quite effectively. Indonesia was able to secure much of its interestsduring the New Order without having to undergo an expensive arms build-up. Thisis in stark contrast to the ‘Konfrontasi’28 policy of Sukarno, which was supportedin the mid-1960s by one of the most well-equipped armed forces in the developingworld, but achieved practically nothing in terms of national interests.From the Javanese viewpoint, leaders who attempt to achieve what they want byusing force or threat of force except in contexts where ‘wars are fought for truth’ areweak leaders whose leadership is artificial and not worth respecting. The Javanesealso view leaders who transform their approach from using the power of influenceto resorting to violence as performing ‘pamrih’. The key is the manner in whichpower is exercised. Is it exercised in a self-interested manner? This shortcomingwas what the Javanese saw in Sukarno. Sukarno had relied primarily on the powerof his charisma during much of his presidency. He was successful in getting internationalrecognition for the republic, and managed to persuade the federal statesof Republik Indonesia Serikat (RUSI, Republic of the United States of Indonesia)to disband themselves and return to the unitary form of the Republic of Indonesia.He also successfully hosted the first Afro-Asian Conference in 1955 in Bandung,which eventually inspired mass decolonization in Asia and Africa. Despite displayingand eventually using some force during the liberation of West Irian, it waseventually the power of diplomacy that brought the territory back to Indonesia.But the whole approach was changed during ‘Konfrontasi’. The threat of forcebegan at the outset of the crisis and followed by the use of it. Therefore, Sukarnohad committed ‘pamrih’. That being said, the use of force as part of official policycannot be ruled out completely. But it has to be used as a last resort, and has to begrounded on a solid rationale. Leaders have to know when to use force. And if thesituation dictates that they should use it, but they hesitated or decided against it,then they are also performing ‘pamrih’. One episode in the epic of Bharatayudhawhere the God Wisnu advised Arjuna not to hesitate in going to war with their evilbrothers, the Kurawa, is often used as a learning point.For practical purposes Indonesian leaders basically view the world as a hostile,uncertain and unsafe environment (Weinstein 1976: 128). Dutch attemptsat neocolonialism in the late 1940s, tacit US support for the PRRI-Permestaregional rebellion in 1958 and the destabilizing influence of communist Chinathrough its support for the PKI in the early 1960s had reinforced the perceptionthat Indonesia was vulnerable to practices of divide and rule carried out bystronger, foreign powers bent on exploiting and/or subjugating Indonesia fortheir interests. This, together with the continuing fear of dismemberment of theIndonesian nation, and the resulting emphasis on unity, political stability and theabsolute sanctity of national borders, led to the promulgation of the ‘archipelagoprinciple’ or Wawasan Nusantara – a concept of territorial and national unitywhich regards Indonesia as an inseparable union of land and water (tanah-air orhomeland) first mooted in 1957. Hence, although Indonesian leaders may view theworld in neorealist terms, interestingly, concepts of deterrence and security haveconsistently been articulated by and large through ideational and non-materialstrategies.Note the language used by Sukarno addresses Indonesia’s security vulnerabilities.That Sukarno consistently emphasized the theme of unity relating it toquestions of domestic and international solidarity was strikingly evident in hispolitical thought, with its emphasis on continuous revolution and self reliance(Berdiri di-atas Kaki Sendiri or ‘standing on one’s own feet’) for a domesticaudience imbued with revolutionary fervour from the War of Independence sincethe late 1940s and familiar with gotong royong (self-help principles) drawn fromJavanese tradition where many necessary village tasks were accomplished throughcommunal effort. At the same time, his brand of nationalism combining anti-Western connotations were motivated by a desire to brandish his credentials as aleader of the developing world. These elements were established in his thinkingfrom the 1930s. In the 1950s, concerns over the excesses of liberal democracy andthe divisions created by it drew him towards establishing a political system witha normative structure that emphasized reaching decisions based on Indonesianvalues of consensus (musyawarah) and deliberation with the aim of preservingnational unity. Similar motivations were at work when in the early 1960s hedevised the acronym NASAKOM to symbolize the unity of nationalism, religionand communism concerned that an Indonesian identity remained elusive. If the preservationof unity and the practical difficulty of achieving it seemed to consume histhinking since 1957, Sukarno nevertheless sought to return to one of his favouritepre-independence themes, namely, anti-imperialism. It was clothed however in adifferent guise. His view of the outside world Nekolim (neocolonialism, colonialismand imperialism) was a 1960s variant of the anti-imperialism stance he heldin the 1920s, the only difference being a worldview that saw the last vestige ofcolonial rule manifesting itself in the form of continuing economic domination orremaining Western spheres of influence in the developing world. Such thinkingwas articulated in the concept of a new struggle between new emerging forces andold established forces ‘between imperialism in its new forms on the one hand andjustice, equality and freedom for the long exploited peoples of the world on the onthe other’ (Legge 2003: 386–7), which was to be transformed in
Sukarno’s owninimitable language as concepts of NEFO and OLDEFO.29 These concepts werenot actually his theories of international order but could be seen as a useful referencepoint for Sukarno on who were his friends and foes. In this regard, the West,particularly through its support of rebels who were behind the regional rebellionsof 1958 in Sumatra and Sulawesi, became his undisputed adversary. Followingthis line of reasoning, the Indonesian government opposed the presence of Britishbases in British North Borneo, Malay and Singapore as well as US bases in thePhilippines. Sukarno’s ‘ideas were no longer attempts at a description of realityor even weapons of revolution but were a means of manipulating the immediatepolitical environment’ (Legge 2003: 389). If the 1920s version of anti-imperialismmeant fighting the Dutch, then his attempt at forging unity and solidarity withinthe Non-Aligned Movement was geared towards highlighting the ‘antithesis betweenwealth and poverty – the new emerging forces, said Sukarno were warningthe affluent societies that they could not go on exploiting the poverty-strickennations’ (Legge 2003: 387). At the 1961 conference of non-aligned states heldin Belgrade, Sukarno delivered his NEFO and OLDEFO concepts thereby establishingIndonesia at the forefront of like-minded nations by declaring a politicalphilosophy that viewed Western economic development as evidence of continuingnineteenth-century practices of imperialism. Following Indonesia’s withdrawalfrom the United Nations in January 1965 Sukarno had proposed a Conference of theNew Emerging Forces (CONEFO), which would formally incorporate Indonesia’sleading role in world non-aligned nations and provide an alternative voice on internationalaffairs to the United Nations. This initiative proved stillborn and the factthat the conference did not take place was a reflection of Sukarno’s waning status,both domestically and internationally.This consistent theme of ‘unity’ and its employment in new circumstances, forinstance, the need to safeguard national self-determination, national security andterritorial integrity, had justified the decision to invade East Timor in 1975 andforcibly integrate the territory. Indeed, virtually the same justification and thesame vocabulary as Sukarno had been employed by two very different Indonesiangovernments during the 1960s, and were ultimately successful in realizing Jakarta’slong-standing claim to the much larger and strategically more important area ofIrian Jaya, now known as Papua. As Michael Leifer explains,both the East Timor and the Irian Jaya acquisitions, although viewed by someas representing expansionistic tendencies on Indonesia’s part, actually hadmuch more to do with a widespread and historically-based Indonesian perceptionof the innate vulnerability of the Republic, especially to any conjuncturebetween dissension and external interference.(Leifer 1983: 174).This last point is particularly crucial in terms of understanding Indonesia’s approachto external security for it reaffirms the extent to which Indonesia is prepared to dowhatever it deems necessary to safeguard its most basic concerns – in this case thesecurity and territorial integrity of the nation itself – even at the risk of doing damageto the conduct of its foreign policy in less immediate and crucial areas. Thereis no doubt that the East Timor takeover had created additional complications anddifficulties in Indonesia’s relations with its major Western trading partners and aiddonors. Equally important, the Timor invasion served to revive (in some sectors,at least) the unfortunate spectrum of an Indonesia bent on further expansion or atleast on asserting its primacy and dominance as the largest and most populous statein the region. As a consequence of concerns that these suspicions and fears persistamong Indonesia’s neighbours, the Indonesian response since 1975 has been togreatly expand bilateral contacts as well as to step up regional diplomacy. Thesemoves would benefit Indonesia in two ways. First, they would provide a platformto build an understanding and appreciation of Indonesia’s positions on policy inregions within the country prone to succession. Second, they would bring to theforefront an effective non-military approach to resolving this perennial problem ofterritorial vulnerability without raising the spectre of Indonesian expansionism.With tensions in the Southeast Asian region increasing following the Vietnameseinvasion of Kampuchea (Cambodia), there was an effort to broaden Indonesia’scomprehensive security doctrine or the doctrine of National Resilience (KetahananNasional) to a concept of Regional Resilience. The fundamental reason for theneed of a strong national and regional resilience is due to the fact that politicalstability is indivisible among the ASEAN states. Political instability in any onestate would have repercussions for all other states since such political instabilityoften spills over the state’s boundary. Hence, the Declaration of ASEAN Concordsigned by the five heads of government in 1976 stated that ‘the stability of eachmember state and of the ASEAN region is an essential contribution to internationalpeace and security. Each member resolves to eliminate threats posed by subversionto its stability, thus strengthening national and ASEAN resilience’ (ASEANSecretariat 1978: 111).The main concern was, of course, internal instabilities with external implications,that is, communist subversion (supported either by the People’s Republicof China or the Soviet Union) and radical Islamic extremism (supported by certainMiddle East countries). The history of post-independence Indonesia is rifewith incidences that indicate that internal instabilities often provide the incentivefor external intervention, which in turn would aggravate the situation. The lackof a credible defence force to serve as a deterrent for external intervention hasled to the need to develop effective non-material strategies to ensure, first, thatIndonesia’s national integrity is not compromised, and second, that a favourableregional security environment is maintained. What is important to remember is thatstrategic doctrines like Wawasan Nusantara (Regional Resilience) do not emergefrom a void. They are a product of culturally informed strategic practices that,while recognizing neorealism’s imperative for need for survival in an anarchicalmaterial environment, conceive of a realpolitik practice in graduated terms. Theseterms employ both material and ideational strategies where calculations are basedon whether or not distributions of power are advantageous or disadvantageousand the degree to which valuable national resources can be mobilized against theemergence of a predator state altering the social structure of state interaction inthe region.Study of international relations in IndonesiaDuring the Dutch colonial period, universities only offered courses on selectedsubjects, mostly on non-political or non-sociological topics such as technology,medicine or law. These fields of study were deemed as useful to fulfil the professionalposts by indigenous Indonesians needed by the colonial government inmanaging and consolidating its rule in the Netherlands East Indies.30So in Indonesia, international relations, like many other branches of socialscience, is a postcolonial field of study. The first IR department in Indonesianuniversities was established at the Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta in 1950as a study programme within the Faculty of Law, and Social and Political Sciences.Other universities then followed in establishing IR departments in the 1950s and1960s. Not much is known about the curriculum, direction or research agenda ofthese departments in the early years, except that most of the programmes weremost probably directed towards producing graduates to fulfil the administrativeand bureaucratic posts of the new state, especially on foreign affairs.Indonesian universities have been known as the hotbed of political activism.Successive governments rose and fell due to pressure of student activism. Butironically,
students of politics or international relations were not known to becomethe student leaders. As in the pre-independence era, most of the activists eithercame from more established fields of study linked to technology, medicine or law,which drew on a larger student cohort.Currently, there are 43 universities that offer IR baccalaureate degree programmesin Indonesia.31 But only 25 of these programmes have received government accreditation.It may seem like many, but it is very small in proportion to the more than2,600 academies, colleges and universities all over the country. However, thereare only two universities that offer a Masters degree programme, and only one ofthem, the University of Indonesia (UI), actually has students enrolled in the programme.No higher educational institutions offer a doctoral degree programme.The latter statistics are probably more indicative of the state of the discipline inthe country.Other statistics indicate the condition of relative deprivation of IR educationin Indonesia. There are more than 10,000 students (52 per cent male; 48 per centfemale) currently enrolled in the baccalaureate degree programme in the field,while only 77 are currently studying in the Masters programme at UI. These studentsare tutored by 514 registered lecturers. Of these lecturers, the majority (285)are holders of a Masters degree, but only 32 of them hold doctorates, slightly morethan six per cent of the total number of lecturers. Large percentages (38 per cent)of them are baccalaureate degree holders.The relatively low educational level among the IR educators is due to two factors:first, the very small number of domestic educational institutions offering IRgraduate degrees. Most of the educators attaining graduate degrees most probablyreceived their graduate education either abroad or in a related non-IR disciplinesuch as politics, government or public administration, which is in better conditionthan IR with regard to graduate education. Second, the universities generally do notoffer a competitive incentive and a clear career path. Additionally, the excessiveteaching load provides a time constraint for the educators to engage in meaningfulresearch activities. Hence, many IR graduate degree holders from abroad usuallydo not make teaching their full-time job, unless of course they already taught priorto pursuing graduate degrees. These foreign graduates tend to pursue a career eitherin the government sector, which provides more job security, or in the private thinktanks that offer higher incentives and more time to do research. While many ofthem still teach, they do it on a part-time basis.32The institution of IR research is also weak. There are not too many universitybasedresearch centres. The existing ones, such as the Centre for InternationalRelations Research (CIRES) in the University of Indonesia, usually do not haverigorous research programmes. This is due to the excessive teaching load of thelecturers. A typical undergraduate programme in Indonesian universities requiresstudents to complete 140–160 credits to receive the baccalaureate degree. So alecturer typically has to teach 5–6 courses per year. There are typically more than100 students in a class. Most university-based research institutes usually carryout projects whose funding comes from government agencies, such as the PolicyResearch and Development Agency (BPPK, Badan Pengkajian dan PengembanganKebijakan) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Deplu, Departemen Luar Negeri).The research done here is primarily policy rather than academically oriented,because there is practically no domestic funding for academic works.There are not too many IR-specific think tanks, either. The most notable isthe Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) based in Jakarta andthe publisher of Indonesia’s most high profile English language journal – TheIndonesian Quarterly. The journal, however, is not devoted solely to IR-relatedtopics and is a reflection of the fact that the CSIS is actually not an IR-specificthink tank. In fact, IR is just one of the three issue areas covered by the CSIS. Theothers are economics, politics and social change. The think tanks are usually verymuch issue-oriented. Many think tanks in Indonesia, such as the CSIS, CIDES, theHabibie Center, the Indonesian Institute, Reform Institute, Akbar Tanjung Institute,Wahid Institute, Soegeng Sarjadi Syndicate, Center for Indonesian Reform andso forth focus primarily on domestic matters due to the salience of such issuesin contemporary Indonesia and correspondingly the promise of better funding.The nature of think tanks in Indonesia also does not support academic enterprise.Many, if not all, Indonesian think tanks were either established by political figuresor hold a certain political orientation. While this phenomenon is not uncommon inmany other parts of the world, it does mean that purely academic works aimed attheory-building that demand conceptual rigour are usually avoided.The other factor that contributes to the lack of serious IR academic endeavourin Indonesia is the absence of an IR epistemic community. There is currently noprofessional association of IR scholars. The closest thing to one is the IndonesianAssociation of Political Science (AIPI, Asosiasi Ilmu Politik Indonesia). But theIR component in AIPI is very much overshadowed by overwhelming interests ondomestic politics. There is also an annual meeting of heads of IR departments. Butthe issues discussed here are mostly about comparing curricula and other teachingrelated matters. From time to time, IR scholars would meet at conferencesorganized by Deplu, but the topics are understandably Indonesian foreign policyoriented.In addition to the lack of epistemic community, there is also practically noincentive at all for the scholars to carry out theory-related studies. In fact, the luresof practical politics, involvement in policy circles and media appearances are muchgreater. There are only a handful of academic journals on IR. The most renownedof which is probably Global, issued by UI’s IR department. But the readershipof this journal is very low in number, and the journal has to struggle just to keeppublishing. The financial and economic crisis that hit the country in 1997 also contributedto the lack of academic writing. In a situation of meagre salaries, scholarsare pressured to publish in order to make additional income. The honorarium forpublishing in academic journals and in the print media is roughly similar, while theeffort is of course markedly different. As a result, there is no incentive for carryingserious academic writing. There is even a critique for Indonesian academia, sayingthat instead of making their doctorate degree as a start of an academic career, theystop writing once they receive their doctorates, and start to enter politics or becomeinvolved in policy circles or even become media personalities.The above factors define the core themes covered by Indonesian IR researchers.Most of the research themes usually follow the priorities of funding agencies,domestic or international. The post-9/11 world has brought the attention of theworld to the issues of security and Islam. As the largest Muslim country in theworld, naturally some of these attentions have focused on Indonesia’s Islam. Thisis also reflected in the increased amount of project funding on this topic, which inturn has made this theme one of the main research themes in Indonesia, combininginternational and domestic aspects. Related to that, the nexus between domestic andregional security, usually related to the issues of illegal logging, human traffickingand terrorism, has also become one of the most popular topics.The curricula of various IR educational institutions have actually shown muchimprovement during the last few years. During the 1970s until much of the 1990s,the discussion on IR theory in classes usually revolved around the so-called firstand second debates in the discipline, that between realism and liberalism, andbetween the legal-institutional approach and behaviouralism. With the return ofmany lecturers from graduate studies in Western universitie
s at the end of the1990s and early 2000s, the curricula became more updated. It is not uncommon,nowadays, to find students’ papers and discussions on the topics such as postmodernismand constructivism. However, most of the literature used usually comesfrom Western textbooks and journals. The effort to locate indigenous sources for IRthinking does not seem to attract a great deal of attention both in and outside of theeducational institutions. The IR department at UI offers a single week on discussionon ‘International Relations Thoughts in Indonesia: Soekarno, Hatta, Sutan Syahrir’in the course of ‘Introduction to International Relations’. But there is no discussionon non-Western traditions in the course ‘International Relations Theory’ taught intwo semesters at the same department (Jurusan HI FISIP UI 1996).33Concluding puzzle: why then the absence of an IndonesianIR theory when there are rich potential sources to be tapped?Indonesia as a nation-state positions itself within the international community byadopting different roles in different cultural or political contexts, all of which arecentral to its identity. These roles are inspired and given substance by indigenoustraditions which have informed Indonesian international relations thinking.However, they are not coherently articulated by the Indonesian academic communityfor a variety of reasons, namely weak institutional structures in IndonesianIR departments, lack of physical resources like libraries and the lack of a viableincentive structure through proper funding and recognition of research, resultingin IR-trained scholars gravitating to topics more pertinent to domestic affairs.Furthermore, diminishing written English language skills may also be a factorexplaining the predominance of Western scholars writing on Indonesian foreignpolicy.Nevertheless, our exercise in ‘pre-theory’ is a first cut at attempting to gleanfrom the long established body of literature on Indonesian studies the sources ofIR thinking and the possibility of multiple identities influencing IR thinking. Thisexercise serves not only the purposes of this book being ‘a systematic attempt togeneralize about the subject matter or IR’ but captures the possibility that internationalrelations thinking operates within differing conceptual frameworks inIndonesia. If realism is the only IR theory that matters, then the obvious conclusionis that the Indonesian case does not count. Yet, are such perspectives pragmaticconsidering the fact that the Republic of Indonesia is the world’s fourth mostpopulous country, the largest democracy in the Islamic world, geo-strategicallySoutheast Asia’s most significant state and having been the driving force behindthe formation of one of the world’s most enduring regional institutions – ASEAN?For purposes of practical policy determined by contingencies surrounding the ‘Waron Terror’, the relevance of Indonesia as a voice of reason in the Islamic world willcontinue to grow enabling it to fulfil its role as a ‘pivotal state’, a point of viewpromoted in an influential study on US foreign policy (Chase et al. 1999: 6, 934).While social constructivist variables like identity, symbols, values, institutions andnorms have great explanatory value in elucidating Indonesian IR practice, to be relevantfor the Indonesian context constructivist approaches need to explain deviantbehaviour, specifically why culturally motivated realpolitik practice, particularlythe use of force, has been evident both in domestic and international affairs sinceindependence.35 In a sense, privileging parsimony, the hallmark of the WesternIR approach focusing solely on either rationalist explanations or constructivistexplanations may not capture the essence of the Indonesian approach to IR. As ourpaper suggests, establishing the complex links between power, identity, interestsand norms in the Indonesian case may not be amenable to capture by any one paradigmand may require eclectic theorizing particularly in contexts where theoriesmerge.36 Naturally this is a speculative essay but it is designed to explore a rangeof possibilities on how the language of Indonesian statecraft can be employed fordomestic theorizing on the subject of international relations. It is a subject worthyof more contextual research. However, at this juncture three observations shouldsuffice providing us a sense of factors that will continue to shape Indonesian thinkingon international relations.First, Indonesia is the world’s largest Muslim country and demographically thelargest democracy in the Islamic world, thereby allowing it scope to conceive ofitself as a leader among Islamic nations. This role has generally been one of mediation,of principled neutrality, that is intended to provide stability and moderation,and to avoid extremism. However, this role is undergoing significant change inconcert with developments within the Islamic world. In Islamic intellectual andsocio-political circles there is a vigorous ongoing debate on the role of Islam in ademocratic and pluralist state. It is a domestic debate enframed within the contextof an Islamic resurgence prominent since the late 1980s particularly on the islandof Java (long known for its adherence to Islam fused with syncretistic beliefs)influenced by a small but vociferous constituency of Muslims who view Islam asa universalistic ideology. Such developments may have an important corollary:namely, possible new directions in foreign policy. Certainly within Indonesia’snew democracy a reassessment of the relationship between the secular nationalistsand Islamic nationalists and debates focused on the re-evaluation of Indonesia’sIslamic identity, issues pertaining to the Jakarta Charter and its relationship withthe 1945 Constitution, and the meaning of the Pancasila (national ideology) couldbecome more pronounced in the new millennium. Significant normative concessionsto Islam have occurred, for example, relating to the introduction of a newEducation Bill and such developments are useful indications of Islam’s greaterbargaining power and influence in the evolving democratic nation-state structurewhich characterizes post-Suharto Indonesia. Thus far, Indonesia has avoided havingan Islamic cast to its foreign policy. However, if Indonesia no longer adoptsconciliatory positions to issues of significance to the Islamic world, then suchchanges in its international outlook will be the consequence of domestic factorsrelated to state formation in post-Suharto era, namely, changes in the religiousaffiliation requirements of the political elite coupled by moves toward the implementationof syariah law.Second, since independence, Indonesia has also aspired to a major role in theNon-Aligned Movement and over time this role has shifted from the radicalismof the Sukarno era to the developmental orientation of the Suharto era and a significantemphasis on democracy, anti-militarism and Islam during the reformasi(reform) era. ASEAN presents yet another forum within which Indonesia regardsitself as the key player and stabilizing force. Perceptions of the international communityhave therefore been formulated in terms not of competing nation-statesbut rather of defined forums or blocs, in which it plays a more or less pivotal role.Dealing with nations outside these blocs like the US, Russia, Japan or China ismore ambiguous. For example, China during the Suharto era was often viewed asa threat, partly on the ground that it represents a rival civilization and ideology.Within the blocs themselves Indonesia sees its own role to some extent in traditionalterms reminiscent not of territorial nation-states with clearly demarcatedborders, but of centres of foci which radiate power and prestige over larger orsmaller regions from one period to another. Indonesia is assumed to stand at thecentre, even of the Islamic world. This does not necessarily imply that Indonesiais to be active in dominating policy making; rather it suggests a sense of playing adignified central role. In this regard, in relations with countries outside its specificforums Indonesian behaviour seems relatively pragmatic
. Indonesia’s occasionalirritations with Malaysia’s assertiveness are an indication of this sense of decorum.So too is the way in which Indonesia seems satisfied with a type of mediating roleamong Islamic countries. Indonesia expects recognition among Islamic nations asthe world’s largest Islamic country. This role has generally been one of relativeneutrality, a desire to avoid unnecessary involvement in irresolvable issues yet aconcern to provide mediation to avoid extremism. For the Javanese, the ultimateend result of such intermandala relationships is the emergence of chakravatin orin Javanese, prabu murbeng wisesa anyakrawati (world ruler). Such an ideal conditionrefers to a ‘world empire, in which all political entities are combined in acoherent unity, and ebb and flow of Power implied in a universe of multiple mandalalocked in conflict with one another (for a time) no longer exists’ (Moertonoin Anderson 1990: 45).Third, the absence of support for Indonesian institutions and researchers workingin the field of international relations and a lack of necessary infrastructure andfunds to support IR teaching, coupled with the relatively low educational levelof lecturers, means the situation for IR research in Indonesia remains bleak andominous. Furthermore, the lack of IR theory research is due also to a preoccupationwith domestic issues among the think tanks on account of the possibility of greaterrecognition and the availability of funds. Such a situation is unfortunate consideringthe need for Indonesian IR scholars with their progressive Islamic backgroundsto contribute constructively global and regional debates relating to the ‘War onTerror’ in an era when Islam has achieved such a high profile. In such a context,wouldn’t a project targeted at rebuilding and strengthening Indonesian researchcapacity within the IR discipline for the purposes of facilitating the developmentof Indonesian expertise on interpreting the evolving system of IR, its implicationsfor Indonesia and Indonesia’s role within it be a worthy cause to support?37 On thequestion of an absence of an IR epistemic community, without the aid of furtherfieldwork it is impossible to prove to what extent the dominance of the Western IRparadigm is responsible for such a situation. However, there is a general perceptionamong the IR academic community in Indonesia that IR is a ‘western’ science, andthis point of view is taken for granted with local IR scholars seeing little reason toquestion such interpretations. Unfortunately, such a situation has produced a senseof alienation among IR scholars. The fact that so many Indonesian IR scholarstend to veer towards analysis of domestic politics later in their careers is probablysymptomatic of this alienation.ReferencesAnderson, B. R. O‘G (1990), Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures inIndonesia, Cornell University Press, Ithaca.Anwar, D. F. (1998), ‘Indonesia: Domestic Priorities define National Security’, inM. Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences. StanfordUniversity Press, Stanford.ASEAN Secretariat (1978), 10 Years of ASEAN, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta.Barton, G. (2002), Gus Dur: The Authorized Biography of Abdurrahman Wahid, EquinoxPublishing Asia Pte Ltd, Jakarta.Chase, R., E. Hill and P. Kennedy (eds) (1999), The Pivotal States: A New Framework forU.S. Policy in the Developing World, W. W. Norton, New York.Djalal, D. P. (1996), The Geopolitics of Indonesia’s Maritime Territorial Policy, Centre forInternational and Strategic Studies, Jakarta.Djiwandono, J. S. (1996), Konfrontasi Revisited: Indonesia’s Foreign Policy UnderSukarno, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta.Effendi, T. N. (1996), ‘Demokrasi dalam Perspektif Budaya Batak’, in M. Najib (ed.),Demokrasi dalam Perspektif Budaya Nusantara, LKPSM, Yogyakarta.Feillard, A. (1999), NU vis-à-vis Negara: Pencarian Isi, Bentuk, dan Makna, LKIS,Yogyakarta.Geertz, C. (1960), The Religion of Java, The Free Press of Glencoe, New York.—— (ed.) (1983), Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretative Anthropology, BasicBooks, New York.International Relations Department of the University of Indonesia (1996), PerkembanganStudi HI dan Tantangan Masa Depan, Pustaka Jaya, Jakarta. International RelationsStudies in China: A Review of Ford Foundation Past Grantmaking and Future Choices(2002), The Ford Foundation, New York.Jenkins, D. (1984), Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975–1983(Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Monograph 64), Cornell University, Ithaca.Katzenstein, P. J. and N. Okawara (2001), ‘Japan, Asia-Pacific Security, and the Case forAnalytical Eclecticism’, International Security, vol. 26, no. 3.Koentjaraningrat, R. M. (1975), Introduction to the Peoples and Cultures of Indonesia andMalaysia, Cummings Publishing Company, Menlo Park, CA.—— (1985), ‘Javanese Terms for God and Supernatural Beings and the Idea of Power’,in A. Ibrahim, S. Siddique and Y. Hussain (eds), Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia,Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.Legge, J. D. (2003), Sukarno: A Political Biography, Archipelago Press, Singapore.Leifer, M. (1983), Indonesia’s Foreign Policy, Allen & Unwin, London.Liddle, R. W. (1996), Leadership and Culture in Indonesian Politics, Allen & Unwin,Sydney.Lubis, T. M. (1992), ‘The Future of Human Rights in Indonesia’, in. H. Crouch and H. Hill(eds), Indonesia Assessment 1992: Political Perspectives on the 1990s (Political andSocial Change Monograph 17), RSPAS Australian National University, Canberra.Milner, A. C. (1982), Kerajaan: Malay Political Culture on the Eve of Colonial Rule,Tucson, University of Arizona Press.Moertono, S. (1968), ‘State and Statecraft in Old Java’, Cornell Modern Indonesia ProjectMonograph, Cornell University, Ithaca.Sairin, S. (1996), ‘Demokrasi dalam Perspektif Kebudayaan Minangkabau’, in M. Najib(ed.), Demokrasi dalam Perspektif Budaya Nusantara, LKPSM, Yogyakarta.Sebastian, Leonard C. (2006), Realpolitik Ideology: Indonesia’s Use of Military Force,Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.Sjamsuddin, N. (1996), ‘Masyarakat Aceh dan Demokrasi’, in M. Najib (ed.), Demokrasidalam Perspektif Budaya Nusantara, LKPSM, Yogyakarta.Sukma, R. (1999), Indonesia and China: The Politics of a Troubled Relationship, Routledge,London.—— (2003), Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy, RoutledgeCurzon, London.Uhlin, A. (1997), Indonesia and the “Third Wave of Democratization”: The IndonesianPro-Democracy Movement in A Changing World, Curzon, Surrey.Weatherbee, D. E. (1966), ‘Ideology in Indonesia: Sukarno’s Indonesian Revolution’Southeast Asia Monograph Series 8, Yale University, New Haven, CT.Weinstein, F. B. (1976), Indonesian Foreign Policy and Dilemma of Dependence, CornellUniversity Press, Ithaca.Yustinianus, S. I. (2005), ‘The Mystic Legacy of Sukarno and Suharto’, The Jakarta Post,8 June.Notes1 The authors would like to express gratitude to the following individuals who havecontributed to the development of ideas contained in this essay: Dr Rizal Sukmaof the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta, Dr MakmurKeliat of the Department of International Relations, University of Indonesia, Jakarta,Dr Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, Dean of the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences,Parahyangan Catholic University, Bandung and Dr Yanyan M. Yani of the Departmentof International Relations, Padjadjaran University, Bandung. Adinda TenriangkeMuchtar of the Indonesian Institute ably aided in collecting materials related to theteaching of international relations in Indonesia and Sammy Kanadi of the S. RajaratnamSchool of International Studies assisted in the final editing of the chapter.2 The doctrine of National Resilience enunciated through the use of carefully craftedSanskrit words consists of eight aspects of national life (Astagatra). Those aspectsare divided in two categories, namely three natural aspects (Trigatra) and five socialaspects (Pancagatra). The three natural aspects are geography, natural resources andpopulation. The five soc
ial aspects are ideology, politics, economy, social-culture anddefence-security.3 While still evident in traditional Javanese thought, such dichotomies are less emphasizedin Indonesia since independence to stress the importance of Indonesian nationalism andnational unity.4 Note the Javanese saying: Akek wong kang wedi kahanan perang, awit hokum kangbecik akeh kang ora kanggo, mula banjur wedi perang. Iku kabeh keliru, jalaran perangiku uga kepingin mbelani kabeneran, meaning: Many are afraid of war, because inwar good rules are ignored. This is wrong because wars are also fought for truth. SeeSebastian 2006: 16.5 Nearly half the people of Southeast Asia are Indonesian. The concentration of largepopulation clusters around a ruler was an undeniable indication of power, which inturn revealed continuing possession of wahyu. A large population also meant a biggerworkforce for rice cultivation, which could result in economic surpluses and the presenceof manpower that could be tapped for building monuments and armies.6 The family of Abdurrahman Wahid’s paternal grandfather Kyai Haji Hasyim Asy’arihad claimed that they descended from the sixteenth-century Javanese King BrawijayaVI. Brawijaya VI’s son Jaka Tingkit has been credited with introducing Islam to thenortheast coastal region of Java. Jaka Tingkit’s son Prince Banawa was known to haverenounced his royal privileges to become a recluse devoted to teaching Sufism. SeeBarton 2002: 38.7 On how military elite, especially those within Suharto’s inner circle, were deployed tosecure the regime’s interests, see Jenkins 1984.8 In the words of Geertz, Java ‘has been civilized longer than England’.9 The word ‘gusti’ is also used to refer to God, which signifies the deep reverence towardthe leaders.10 Known as ‘pusaka’ or sacred things. These can be in the forms of certain kris (dagger),spears, carriages, musical instruments etc.11 Conflict in the world of the wayang kulit is not between good and bad but generally castin shades of black and white. More significant is the emphasis placed on those who arespiritually developed versus spiritually underdeveloped.12 The approximate meaning is ‘concealed personal motive’.13 The classification of the Sundanese of West Java is rather difficult. Due to the historicalrivalry with the Javanese kingdoms, the Sundanese always insist that they arenon-Javanese. However, to classify them as Seberang is quite problematic, because theextent of Hindu influence is equally extensive in the Sunda land as in Central and EastJava, especially in the eastern part where the courts of the old Sundanese kingdom ofPadjadjaran was located.14 It is important to note here that some interior Seberang ethnic groups were still livingin a fairly simple, secluded style, and still practice certain kind of animist beliefs (usuallyin combination with the practice of major religion, most notably Christianity).This is especially true in Papua (Irian Jaya), as well as some ethnic groups in Sumatra,Kalimantan and Sulawesi. Being situated in the margins of the country’s social andpolitical relations, they are relatively less significant in shaping up what is being consideredhere as the Seberang political-culture.15 The high level of influence of Hinduism in Bali shares many similarities in politicalculture with the Javanese. Historically, the royal families of Bali originated from theMajapahit court fleeing from Java during the power struggle with the Islamic sultanateof Demak.16 The variant of the language used as the lingua franca was the Melayu pasar (marketMalay). A different variant is used among the Malay aristocracy, which is a more stratifiedone. But even the extent of stratification of the latter variant is not as complex asthe Javanese language.17 The literal translation is ‘rude’. However, it may also be read as ‘uncivilized’.18 More recently, there has been a speculation that Islam also came to Indonesia fromChina, brought by some of the Muslim Chinese envoys, the most popular of whomwas Admiral Zheng He, and that it came directly to Java. However, such claims arecontentious and require verification.19 The Western Protestant and Catholic missionaries, who later accompanied the traders,converted the peoples in areas where Islamic influence was weak. Such peoples wereprimarily the interior peoples of Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Papua, as well asthe coastal people of southern Maluku and the eastern part of the Lesser Sundas. Untiltoday, the Protestants and Catholics of Indonesia, who make up around 10 per cent ofthe whole population, come primarily from these ethnic groups.20 There were nine prominent wali, affectionately known to the Javanese as ‘Wali Songo’.Each of these wali were said to possess supernatural abilities. Many stories surroundingthe wali and their proselytization efforts were imbued with tales of mysticism. Thesemyths, as well as the use of local folklore in conveying religious messages, greatlyfacilitated the spread of Islam in Java, as the Javanese felt that they could relate easilyto the new religion.21 The version of Islam that arrived in Southeast Asia might have been infused with Sufismthat had previously taken root in the subcontinent where it came from. This appearedto facilitate its compatibility with local existing religions.22 These consist of belief in one God – Allah, performing prayer five times daily, fastingduring the Ramadhan month, giving alms (zakat) according to Islamic law and performingthe Haj to Mecca if financially viable.23 This means ‘red’. The term was introduced into academic circles by Geertz in ‘TheReligion of Java’. The term came from the colour of the cloth (actually the colour wasred earth) that these Javanese wore, as opposed to the white cloth worn by the morepious Javanese Muslims (putihan).24 After the failed communist coup in 1965, there was fervour for religions, partly inducedby the government. Hence all Indonesians had to declare faith in one of the five officiallyrecognized religions (Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism).Most of the Javanese claimed Islam as their religion. However, in the 1970s, there wasa movement to get the Kejawen recognized as a religion. Later it was acknowledgedas the ‘Kepercayaan atas Tuhan Yang Maha Esa’ (belief in the one God). Althoughit was not officially acknowledged as a religion, it acquired equal legal position withthe religions. For a concise account of Kejawen practices, see Koentjaraningrat 1975:112–19.25 The words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad, which deal mainly with social andpolitical issues.26 ‘Interpretation’ or ‘reinterpretation’ of the Islamic texts.27 From this perspective, Michael Leifer’s ‘sense of regional entitlement’ came as a naturalresult of the Javanese conception of leadership. Every Javanese leader would havethis sense of entitlement, for without it, he or she would not have become an effectiveleader.28 A policy derived from the changing external policies under Sukarno’s GuidedDemocracy, which was an expression of Indonesian foreign bellicosity. It was a strategydesigned to daunt the Dutch in the West Irian campaign and the British in the Malayancampaign through the use of diplomatic and military measures of intimidation.29 For an analysis on the concepts NEFO and OLDEFO, see Weatherbee 1966.30 As history has it, the selective education given to the indigenous population did notactually halt the growth of self-determination sentiments. Like in many other colonialsocieties, the struggle for independence was spearheaded by the intellectuals, productsof the colonial government’s education system. As a result, Indonesia’s foundingfathers were either engineers (like Sukarno), doctors (like the founders of the firstnationalist organization, Boedi Oetomo) or lawyers (like Hatta, the Republic’s firstvice president).31 The statistics presented here are acquired from various publications published by theDirectorate General for Higher Education (Dirjen Dikti, Direktorat Jenderal PendidikanTinggi) and Department of National Education (Depdiknas, Departemen PendidikanNasional). Note
that the year of data collection varies, but the most recent data availableis from 2005. NGOs are also not interested in foreign policy issues.32 Building a career purely on international relations expertise generally results in poor jobprospects unless there are adequate avenues for consultancy work. In a country where thebasic salary for an academic is significantly low there is a need to combine scholarshipwith supplementary consultancy-based income. Those specializing in internationalrelations theory or foreign policy analysis rarely get many opportunities to augmenttheir meagre salaries hence the majority will gravitate to the more lucrative fields ofdomestic politics or development-related studies. If IR-trained scholars do write, theyinvariably contribute to the mainstream press such as Kompas, Media Indonesia, Tempo,Sinar Harapan, Republika and the English language daily The Jakarta Post where theprospects for decent remuneration are better. As a consequence, the record is better andthere is a wide range of commentary available in the media on topics related to foreignrelations. The lack of incentive, particularly to publish in English has resulted in justa handful of books published over the last decade by Indonesian-based scholars. Themost significant being: Anwar 1994; Djiwandono 1996; Djalal 1996; and Sukma’stwo books of 1999 and 2003. With the exception of Djalal, a former Foreign Ministryofficial and currently President Yudhoyono’s spokesperson for international affairs, allof the above scholars are based in think tanks. This is a sad indictment on the state ofuniversity-based research on international relations in Indonesia.33 Even the Indonesian language publication on IR theory published almost a decade agodid not hint on any possibility of looking at indigenous sources for theorizing. Thearticles in the publication merely reported the state of the art of IR discipline in theWest, and the possibility of the application of its theories for the Indonesian context.34 A ‘pivotal state’ is a ‘geo-strategically important state to the United States and its allies’and its importance is attributed to its ability not only to ‘determine the success or failureof its region but also significantly affect international stability’. See Chase et al. 1999:6, 9.35 For an attempt to reconcile both rationalist and constructivist explanations in analysingthe sources of Indonesian military doctrine, see Sebastian 2006.36 For the most substantial analysis on the subject of eclectic theorizing, see Katzensteinand Okawara 2001: 153–85.37 An audit of the international relations discipline in Indonesia similar to an initiativeembarked upon recently in China by the Ford Foundation would go some way toaddressing some of the problems highlighted in this paper and provide the way ahead interms of reinvigorating the field. See International Relations Studies in China: A Review of Ford Foundation Past Grantmaking and Future Choices (Anon 2002).Source: Non-Western International Relations Theory Perspectives on and beyond AsiaEdited by Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan

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